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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals, following an
appeal from the Fourth District Court in and for Wasatch County.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to § 78-2a-3(2) (h) .
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III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
A.

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE
ADEQUATE FINDINGS TO SUPPORT ITS ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

In imputing income to the Appellant based on voluntary

underemployment?
2.

In its child support award for seven children?

3.

In failing to award Appellant alimony?

4.

In awarding Appellee the benefits of any pay-down by

Appellant of the mortgage upon the marital home and the benefits of
its appreciated value as of the date of pay-off by Appellant to
Appellee of his equitable interest in the home.
5.

In failing to require Appellee to pay the parties' entire

USAA debt?
6.

In failing to award Appellant her requested attorney's

7.

Appellant also requests attorney's fees and costs of

fees?

Court for the prosecution of this appeal.
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and

testimony of the parties (Transcript P. 25 L. 3) and the Memorandum
Decision (R. 159) as was Appellant's claim for child support for
the seven minor children (Transcript, P. 100, L. 19). Appellant
also objected to Appellee's child support worksheet
(Transcript, P. 28).
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STATUTES
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a n order
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during marriage.
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to p r o v i d e child care f o r t h e d e p e n d e n t children,, n e c e s s i t a t e d b y
the pmpl nvTUfi*- or t r a i n i n g of t h e custodial p a r e n t .
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution
of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4)(a)
In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the court
shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include an order
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among
other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a
court ordered visitation schedule entered under this
chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is denied, the court shall
order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys fees expended
by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines
that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended
against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the
immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney's fees and
court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii)the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony;
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). However,
the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard
of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the

xi

m a r r i a g e , the court m a y consider the standard
.ivina that
existed at the time of the marriao
(d) T h e court may, UT- .
apprupr^at^ ^-.uumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties :-L\-ctive standards of living.
(e ) W h e n a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
thresiiuxu of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due
to the collective efforts of both, that change shall b e considered
in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of
alimony.
If one spouse's earning capacity h a s been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage,
the court m a y make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
d u r a t i o n dissolves, and n o children have been conceived or born
di iring the m a r r i a g e , the court m a y consider restoring each p a r t y to
t1' * c o n d i t i o n w h i c h e x i s t e d at the t i m e of the m a r r i a g e .
rhe court h a s c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n to m a k e
SUJJ
vjiiciuj^s a n d n e w o r d e r s r e g a r d i n g a l i m o n y b a s e d on a
sub*
_ material change in c i r c u m s t a n c e s n o t f o r s e e a b l e at the
time of the d i v o r c e .
(ii) The cour t m a y
i,,
. _
.t . lew
o r d e r ::r a l i m o n y to addr ess neet
.e rec _ . . chat did not

exist ,-r: \he time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii)
In determining alimony, the income .,f any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not oe considered, except as
provided in this subsection
(A) The court i ._. consider the r-'^^cru^r1.^
spouse's financial ability to share l:v::ia - xpensei
(B) T h e court m a y consider the
a
4,,
subsequent spouse if the court finds tha- the pavo:
er
conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) A l i m o n y m a y not be ordereu
..r a uaraLicii ^.onyei
than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any
time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment r*f -r. imony for - n ~nger
period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce
--cifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon
the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying
alimony is made a party :
xion of annulment and
his rights are determined,
xii

(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary.
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and
decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from
the
district
court
review
of
information
adjudicative proceeding so the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department
of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the State
engineer.
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative
proceedings
of
agencies
of
political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 6346a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a
first degree or capital felony.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals
from
the
orders
on
petitions
for
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony.
xiii

(h) appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support,
visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court
for original appellate review and determination any matter of which
the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

xiv

78-45-7.2

Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.

(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative
order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered
on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttal presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of
temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and
considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts
resulting from the application of the guidelines, the use of
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who
live in the home of that parent and are not children in common to
both parties may at the option of either party be taken into
account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child
support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute
the obligations of the respective parents for the additional
children.
The obligations shall then be subtracted from the
appropriate parent ! s income before determining the award in the
instant case.
(5) In
a
proceeding
to
modify
an
existing
award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other than those in
common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in
the award but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the
award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the
guidelines and any subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes
a substantial or material change of circumstances as a ground for
modification or adjustment of a court order, if there is a
difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request
modification, in accordance, with the requirements of the Family
Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more often than once
every three years.

xv

Section 78-45-7.5.

Determination of gross income - Imputed income.

(1)

As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including
nonearned sources, except under Subjection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties,
bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits, workers1
compensation benefits,
unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits,
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income earned from earned income sources is limited to
the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only
if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the
court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the
parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from the gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) Benefits received under a housing subsidy program,
the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I. , Medicaid, Food
Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) Other similar means-tested welfare benefits received
by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be
reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support
award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted
from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may
differ from the amount of business income determined for
tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed
on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the
average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs
or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns
from at least the most recent year unless the court finds

xvi

the verification is not reasonably valid. Verification
of income from records maintained by the Office of
Employment Security may be substituted for pay stubs,
employer statements, and income tax returns,
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to
determine whether an underemployment or overemployment
situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under
Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall
be based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and
prevailing
earnings
for persons
of
similar
backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall
be imputed as least at the federal minimum wage for a 40hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings
of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the
parents' minor children approach or equal the
amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) if a parent is physically or mentally disabled
to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii)
a parent
is engaged
in career or
occupational training to establish basic job
skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child
require the custodial parent's presence in the
home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child
who is the subject of a child support award nor benefits
to a child in the child's own right such as Supplemental
Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be
xvii

considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
§ 78-45-7.7

Calculation of obligations.

(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided
between them in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless
the low income table is applicable.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split
custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the base
child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents
and determine the base combined child support obligation
using the base combined child support obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the
combined child support obligation by each parent's
percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the
obligor is between $650.00 and $1,050, the base child support award
shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with
Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the low income
table.
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides
combined child support obligations for up to six children.
For
more than six children, additional amounts may be added to the base
child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by Subsection 7845-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less than the amount
which would be ordered for up to six children.
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is
$649 or less, the court or administrative agency shall determine
the amount of the child support obligation on a case by case basis,
but the child support award shall not be less than $20.00.
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for
the total number of children, not an amount per child.
Rule 4-912.

Child Support Worksheets.

Intent:
To assist judges and commissioners in applying the statutory
child support guidelines to determine child support awards.
To assist the Administrative Office in collecting data
regarding child support awards in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 667.
xviii

Applicability:
This rule applies to every final order of child support,
including modifications of existing awards.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) The parties shall prepare a worksheet
containing
information set forth in Appendix G. If the filing party is the
Office of Recovery Services, the section on "child care adjustment"
need not be completed.
(2) The parties shall file a completed worksheet with the
court and the information thereon shall be provided to the
Administrative Office of the Court.
(A) If the information on the worksheet is not
electronically transferred to the Administrative Office by the
filing party, that party shall file the worksheet in duplicate
with the court. The clerk of court shall send one copy of the
worksheet to the Administrative Office.
(B) If
the
information
on
the
worksheet
is
electronically transferred to the Administrative Office by the
filing party, the party shall so indicate on the worksheet and
shall file a single copy of the worksheet with the court.
(3) The court shall not enter the final decree of divorce,
final order of modification, or final decree of paternity until the
completed worksheet is filed.
(4) The Administrative Office shall compile the data
contained on the worksheet and shall annually provide a report to
the Child Support Guidelines Advisory Committee regarding the
compiled data. (Added effective April 15, 1995.)
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VI.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

NATURE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION.
The nature of this case is an appeal from a Supplemental

Decree of Divorce resulting from a trial held on November 21, 1996
before

the

Honorable

Howard

Maetani

Courthouse in Heber City, Utah.

at

the

Wasatch

County

Following the trial, the Court

ordered that the parties' counsel submit proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as to the issues of child support, alimony,
the marital residence, premarital property and attorney's fees.
Thereafter, the Court made and entered its Memorandum Decision in
February

of

1997 and a Supplemental Decree was prepared by

Appellee's counsel which was objected to.

Thereafter, the Court

made and entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision on April 29,
1997, and thereafter the Court entered a Supplemental Decree of
Divorce, but failed to enter adequate and sufficient Findings of
Fact or a Child Support Worksheet to support its Supplemental
Decree of Divorce from which Appellant herewith appeals.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

DiAnn (Defendant and Appellant) and Melvon David Turner

(Plaintiff and Appellee) were married on March 18, 1966, in Logan,
Utah (Divorce Complaint, R. P. 1).
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2.

During their marriage, they had 12 children (Divorce

Complaint, R. P. 1), seven (7) of whom were minor children at the
time of trial on November 21, 1996

(Transcript, P. 96, L. 9)

including one who had turned 18 on November 7, 1996, but who had
not yet graduated from high school (Transcript P. 29).
3.

At trial, Mr. Turner was employed at the Utah Department

of Employment Security (Transcript P. 12, L. 4), earning $53,534.00
per year or $4,461.00 per month and resided in St. George, Utah
(Transcript P. 11, L. 19.); (Memorandum Decision, R. 155).
4.

At the time of trial, DiAnn had degrees in education and

nursing (Transcript, P. 78, L. 15-16), but had elected not to work
full-time outside the home (Transcript, P. 80, L. 17). In 1995,
her income from nursing was $29,875 (Transcript P. 155) and, in
1996, she earned $19,783.50 (Transcript, P. 110, L. 18) through
October 12, 1996. Her gross monthly income at trial was $1,123.00
(Transcript P. 100, L. 20) for 32 hours per week (Transcript P. 110
L. 23.).
5.
interest

During the marriage, DiAnn acquired a one-fifth (1/5)
in Duke

Farms,

Inc., a

farm owned

by

her parents

(Transcript P. 82, L. 6-9). In the early 1970's, DiAnn's parents
gifted to the parties one-third of an acre of raw ground in Heber,
Utah (Transcript P. 84, L. 10-14).

A home was built on the land by

the parties valued by the Trial Court at $199,500.00, with a
xx i

current mortgage at the time of trial in the amount of $29,500.00.
The value of the raw land was $42,000.00 (Memorandum Decision, R.
156) .
6.

As a result of the parties' respective employment, Mr.

Turner had a retirement plan with a cash value of $50,300.00, as of
September 30, 1996, and DiAnn had a retirement plan with a cash
value of $9,133.00 (Memorandum Decision, R. 157).
7.

The Court found that in addition to the mortgage, the

parties had a USAA marital debt in the amount of $11,600.00
(Memorandum Decision R. 159).
8.

At the time of trial, the parties' seven minor children,

ranging in age from 6 to 18, resided in the home and in the sole
custody of DiAnn who had changed her employment hours from evenings
and weekends to days in order to care for the children, thereby
losing a shift differential of $5.00 per hour (Transcript, P. 96,
L. 11) .
9.

One child threatened suicide after the parties separated

and the children were in counseling (Transcript, P. 98, L. 16-17).
10.

At the time of trial, DiAnn's monthly expenses totaled

$2,830.00 (Memorandum Decision, R. 154).
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VII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
DiAnn, on appeal, argues that the Trial Court abused its
discretion and failed to make adequate Findings when it unjustly
imputed income to her. The unrebuted plain evidence indicated that
the unusual emotional and other needs of the children required her
presence in the home.

This required a change in her employment

hours resulting in less income than she earned during the marriage
when DiAnn and her husband co-parented the children.
The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to its child
support award for seven (7) minor children entitled to support and
failed to require the filing of a Child Support Worksheet as
required by Rule 4-912 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
The Court also erred and abused its discretion when it
unjustly failed to award alimony to DiAnn.
misplaced its reliance on Mortensen

The Trial Court

v. Mortensen,

760 P. 2d 304

(Utah 1988) without making adequate Findings regarding whether or
not her gifted asset (Duke Farms) was income producing or otherwise
allowed DiAnn to meet her own needs.

The Court made no

Findings

as to the need of DiAnn for alimony, the ability of Mr. Turner to
pay alimony and the ability of DiAnn to provide for her own needs
(and the needs of the children), the length of the marriage, and
the fault of Turner resulting in both the divorce and DiAnnfs
change in employment and loss of income.

The Court failed to make

Findings as to the effect imputed income had on her actual need for
alimony.
The Court also erred in ordering that Turner should receive
the benefit of any appreciation in value of the home and the
benefits of any pay down of the mortgage by DiAnn, pending payment
to Turner of his equitable interest.

Turner's equity was ordered

to be paid upon the occurrence of the standard triggering events
(death, remarriage, cohabitation, attainment of the age of majority
by the youngest

child).

The Court

failed to make Findings

regarding the factors identified by the Utah Supreme Court in Burke
v.

Burke,

733 P.2d

133

(Utah 1987), regarding

its property

distribution.
Additionally, the Court erred in failing to make Findings
regarding the ability of DiAnn to pay one-half (1/2) of the USAA
debt and why it failed to award DiAnn her requested attorney's
fees.
In sum, the Supplemental Decree of Divorce is not supported by
either the evidence or the law, or by adequate Findings of Fact,
and the Court abused its discretion in making its Orders and awards
thereunder, creating an unjust result.

The resultant orders were

based on legally insufficient Findings or lacked any Findings at
all as required by Nilley

v.

Willey

2

(333 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (Utah

1997) . This case should be remanded to the Trial Court for
appropriate Findings,

Watson v. Watson,

561 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1977)

and DiAnn should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.
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VIII.
ARGUMENT
A.

Imputation of Income - Voluntary Underemployment.

The Court erred in failing to make adequate and appropriate
Findings

as

to

whether

or

not

Appellant

was

voluntarily

underemployed as required by § 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) , (d) .

The Trial

Court must make adequate Findings of Fact to permit Appellant
review.
Willey,

Willey

v. Willey,

866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993); Willey

914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996); Willey

Adv. Rpt 8 (Utah 1997); Montoya

v. Montoya,

v.

Willey

v.

333 Utah

696 P.2d 1193 (Utah

1988) .
Despite the unrebuted testimony of Appellant, DiAnn Turner, as
to the unusual emotional and physical needs of the children
requiring her presence in the home (Transcript P. 98, 99), the
Court imputed income to DiAnn based upon her 1995 gross income.
DiAnn testified that she changed her shifts at work from weekend
and evenings to a day shift following the parties' separation
(Transcript, Pgs. 96-97).
that

The unrebuted testimony at trial was

DiAnn Turner was the sole custodial parent of seven minor

children, ranging in age from 6 to 18 and that she needed to work
days while her children were in school (Transcript, P. 98, L. 3).
The children were suffering greatly and she had to take them to
counseling and one child even threatened suicide (Transcript, P.
4

98, L. 15-17).

DiAnn was concerned about their psychological

health and a great deal of work was involved in taking care of the
house and the seven children (Transcript P. 99) .
As DiAnn testified at trial, "I go to work at 6:30.
generally get up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning.
machine never stops.
on Sunday.

I do 6 to 8 loads a day.

The washing

I try not to wash

If I am home, I scrub the floors every day.

from scratch.

I

I bake

I make homemade breads and pies.

I have a, (sic) my

children are supposed to help in the house.

They all have an

assigned room, but since their father left, they said that they are
not going to help.
children,

so

I am getting very little help from the

I am basically

being

the maid

for

7 people."

(Transcript. P. 99, L. 6-15.)
The Court failed to make Findings as to whether or not the coparenting efforts of the parties prior to separation enabled DiAnn
Turner to work weekends and evenings, whereby she could obtain a
higher rate of pay and was available and capable to work more
hours.

(Transcript P. 96, L. 7-12.)

DiAnn testified at trial in response to the question: "Let me
ask you what is the reason you have found it necessary to cut back
on your employment from the types of hours you had in 1994, when
you were taking all of the overtime."

DiAnn replied:

"At that

time, I was working mainly weekends and graveyards and it was
5

because my husband was available to tend the eight children that
were at home.

With him gone, I have to work days and it gives a

decrease in hourly wage of $5.00 an hour." (Transcript. P. 96, L.
3-11) .
When the parties lived together, Mr. Turner worked a normal
work week, Monday through Friday during the day, and each party was
available in the home when the other one wasn!t there to take care
of the children.

(Transcript, P. 96, L. 23-25, P. 97 L. 1.)

He

has only visited the children twice since he moved to St. George.
(Transcript P. 97, L. 19-25)

His lack of assistance in parenting

the children and visiting with them has made it impossible for
DiAnn to work the hours she had before (Transcript. P. 98, L. 1-3) .
The Court erred and abused its discretion when its sole finding was
that "Defendant is employable, and able to work at a level above
which she is currently employed."

(Memorandum Decision, R. 157.)

Section 78-45-7.5(7) (a) requires that a hearing must be held
and a finding made that a parent is voluntarily underemployed and
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iv) provides that income may not be imputed if
the unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.

Here, the fact that Mr.

Turner resides some 300 miles from the seven remaining minor
children in the home who have been in counseling and one of whom
has threatened suicide required the Court to make Findings as to
6

its basis for imputing income to DiAnn other than "she is able to
work at a level above which she is currently employed."

(R. 157.)

The Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Memorandum Decision (R. 154),
and Supplemental Memorandum Decision (R. 189) are insufficient to
allow imputation of income to DiAnn Turner and create an unjust and
illegal result.
Even if the Court were to establish child support based upon
Findings sufficient to

impute income to DiAnn, the Court pursuant

to § 78-45-7.2(3), should have considered the evidence and made
Findings as to whether or not the application of the guidelines
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interests of a
child in this particular case.

The guidelines are rebutable and,

given the evidence before the Court of the work involved in meeting
the needs of the seven children without alimony or cooperation from
Turner, application of the guidelines under such circumstances is
unjust and inappropriate.

It would be in the best interests of the

children under these circumstances for the Court to rebut the
presumption of the application of the guidelines, given the fact
that their father's co-parenting no longer existed and no alimony
was awarded.
The issue of a voluntary reduction of income has recently been
thoroughly

analyzed by Professor Louis Becker.

In Becker's

Connecticut Law Review article, "Spousal and Child Support and the
7

"Voluntary Reduction of Income Doctrine1" (Connecticut Law Review,
Vol. 29, # 2, Winter 1997),

Becker describes three tests used by

various jurisdictions in analyzing the voluntary reduction of
income for child support purposes. Some Courts apply a strict rule
and place the sole priority on the support obligation.

Professor

Becker opines that the "strict test" is too inflexible and is
fatally flawed in that it disregards all facts other than the
support obligation and fails to consider any other interest of the
beneficiary

of

the

support

order.

The

Turner

children,

beneficiaries of DiAnn1s support obligation, also benefit from
DiAnn1s homemaking skills and parenting.
test

does not

allow a balancing

of

Application of a strict
interests

sufficient

determine what is in the best interests the Turner children.

to
Are

the children's best interests served by imputing additional income
to DiAnn in order to reduce Mr. Turner's support obligation or are
their best interest's served by increasing Mr. Turner's share of
the support obligation in order to allow DiAnn to care for the
children during the difficult days following separation of their
parents and thereafter?

The Trial Court allowed Turner to escape

his parenting and financial responsibilities when it unjustly
punished DiAnn by imputing income to her and not awarding alimony
to her.
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The second test, "good faith," used by some other courts gives
less weight to the support obligation and more to the motivation of
the obligor.

Under that test, the facts of this case would allow

DiAnn to voluntarily reduce her income based on her good faith
efforts

to supplant

the lack of

co-parenting by Mr. Turner

following the parties* separation.

Should this Court choose to

apply the good faith test, it is clear that DiAnnfs motivation in
reducing her income and changing her shifts from evenings and
weekends to a day shift so that she can work when the children are
at school is in good faith and no income would be imputed to her.
The "intermediate test" advocated by Becker balances support
obligations with the best interests of the children and allows
flexibility.

Becker's article asserts that there is an increasing

trend in the adoption of an intermediate approach in the context of
employment

related

decisions.

Becker

proposes

that

the

intermediate test be comprised of the reasons for underemployment
asserted by the party whose conduct is at issue, the impact upon
the obligee in considering the actual earnings of the obligor and
whether the party complaining of the voluntary reduction in income
acquiesced in the conduct of the other party, and finally, the
timing of the action in question in relation to the entering of a
Decree.

9

The evidence at trial was that DiAnn Turner was forced to cut
back on her hours and readjust her schedule because Mr. Turner
moved to St. George and was unable to fulfill his share of the
parenting duties of the parties' seven children (Transcript P. 96,
L. 7-11).
have

Had the Court awarded alimony to DiAnn, Mr. Turner might

an argument

against

any

increase

in his

obligation as a result of DiAnn's underemployment.

child

support

The evidence at

trial demonstrated that prior to separation, both parties arranged
their work schedules so that someone could be in the home with the
children when the other was at work

(Transcript Pgs. 96-97).

Because of Turner's acquiescence to that situation, he should be
estopped from claiming that DiAnn should be assessed a percentage
of child support based on an income she was no longer able to earn
after their separation while she fulfilled his parenting duties.
Some jurisdictions have held that the court need not consider
a parent's earning capacity if the voluntary underemployment is in
the best interests of the children; Olsen

v.

Olsen,

620 N.W.2d

(N.D. 1994) . Some courts have held that a downward modification of
a child support order is appropriate if it allows a parent to
exercise visitation rights.

Mull in

v.

Mull in,

634 N.E.2d 1340

(Ind. App. 1994) . This Court should consider adopting a flexible
approach to balance earning ability with the parenting needs of the
children in order to serve the best interests of the beneficiaries
10

of the support award.

Such an approach is consistent with the

policy

raised

considerations

by

§§

78-45-7.2(3)

and

78-45-

7.5(7) (d) .
Because § 78-45-7.2 provides that the child support guidelines
may

be

rebutted

in

the

event

they

appear

to

be

unjust,

inappropriate or not in the best interests of the child, DiAnn
submits that this Court should apply an intermediate test and
balance the difference between DiAnn's actual income and her
historical income against the benefits of her working when the
children are in school and being home when they are not in order to
meet their needs to determine what is in the best interests of the
children, thereby rebutting the Guidelines.
make

Findings

in

response

to

DiAnn!s

The Court failed to

claims

regarding

the

childrens1 needs and the plain evidence at trial and, therefore,
this case should be remanded for adequate Findings.
Montoya,

696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1988), Watson v. Watson,

Montoya

v.

561 P.2d 1072

(Utah 1977) .
B.

Child Support Award for More than Six Children.

The Trial Court awarded DiAnn the sum of $1,452.80 for child
support (Memorandum Decision R. 157). The Court made no Findings
of Fact supporting its award of child support other than the award
was based on the income of the parties. Despite the fact that Rule

11

4-912 of the Code of Judicial Administration mandates that " . . .
the Court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, . . . until
the completed [child support] worksheet is filed", no child support
worksheet has been filed in connection with the Supplemental Decree
of Divorce.
The base combined child support obligation table (§ 78-457.14) provides combined child support obligations for up to six
children.

Section 78-45-7.7(4) provides that "[F]or more than six

children, additional amounts may be added to the base support
obligation shown.

Unless rebutted by § 78-45-7.2(3), the amount

ordered shall not be less than the amount which shall be ordered
for up to six children."

Because there is no child support

worksheet or additional findings to support the Court's child
support award of $1,452.80, appellate review of the Court's child
support award is impossible. The child support obligation for the
combined gross income of the parties as found by the Trial Court
for six children is $2,134.00.

Assuming arguendo,

that Mr.

Turner's share of the total child support obligation for six
children would have been $1,387.10, the Trial Court abused its
discretion when it awarded an additional $65.70 to DiAnn for the
one (1) additional child not contemplated by the child support
obligation tables (Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985)) .
An extrapolation of the child support obligation for seven children
12

from the figures used in the tables for six children would result
in a child support award of $1,578.00, using DiAnn's imputed income
of $2,490.00. Using DiAnn's actual income of $1,123.00 per month
would result in an extrapolated child support award of $1,725.00.
While

extrapolation

may

not

be

the

appropriate

way

to

determine a child support obligation for income in excess of the
tables1, the Trial Court should be required to make Findings as to
any additional amounts it awards when there are more than six
children.

The extrapolated child support worksheets are attached

to this Brief as Addenda "A" and "B."
At trial, Turner offered a 7-child worksheet

(R. P. 35),

whereby he "took the difference between 5 and 6 and added the same
amount to make up for the next column" (Transcript P. 29, L. 18) .
The fallacy in this approach to determine the correct support
amount

for

children

in excess

of

6 is that

the per child

progressive increase varies for each additional child.

Using the

Turners'

income, the difference between 5 and 6 children is

$136.00.

The difference between 4 and 5 children is $164.00, 3 and

^Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d (Utah App. 1996). The public policy concerns that a linear extrapolation of a
support obligation for income in excess of the tables could vastly exceed any reasonable need for support are
distinguishablefroman extrapolation of the number of children in excess of die table. Each additional child still has
a need for support. Hie per child amount of support using DiAnn's actual income is $308.00 and the base combined
support obligation is $2,156.00 after being extrapolated to 7 children (Addenda "B") and $355.00 per child using
DiAnn's imputed income (Addenda "A"), clearly a reasonable amount of child support for each child's need. DiAnn
recognizes that on remand the issue of extrapolation for 7 children will be moot as the seventh will have graduated
from high school.
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4 is $323.00, 2 and 3 is $323.00 and 1 and 2 is $508.00.

Why

should the first additional child need $508.00 of support and the
7th

only

$134.00?

The Court made no Findings as to Turner's

worksheet objected to by Di Ann (Transcript P. 28, L. 11).
C.

The Court Abused its Discretion and Erred in Failing to
Award Alimony to Appellant and for Failing to Render
Appropriate Findings.

The Trial Court, apparently hanging its hat on Mortensen
Mortensen,

760

P.2d

Plaintiff alimony.

304

(Utah

1988),

failed

to

award

v.

to the

(R. 155.)

Section 30-3-5(7) sets forth the considerations for the Court
in determining alimony.

The law is well-settled that for the court

to award or not to award alimony to a party, it must make adequate
{Haumont

and appropriate Findings.
App. 1990.) {Willey

v. Willey)

v. Haumont,

(supra)

793 P. 2d 421 (Utah

. Those Findings must address

the need of the recipient for alimony, the ability of the payor to
pay alimony and the recipient's ability to provide for her own
support.
Rudman

v.

{Haumont
Rudman,

v.

Haumont,

793 P.2d 421

(Utah App. 1990);

812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991)).

Without making

any Findings regarding whether or not the family farm known as Duke
Farms provided an income to DiAnn, the Court determined that the
mere fact that it awarded to DiAnn her gifted interest in Duke
Farms

is

a

sufficient

reason

not
14

to

award

alimony

to

her

(Memorandum Decision R. 158) . Mortensen,

supra,

requires Findings

as to whether the separate property is income producing.
at

308.

The

Court

also

failed

circumstances as required by Burke

to
v.

analyze

Burke,

the

760 P.2d
pertinent

733 P. 2d 133 (Utah

1987).

No Findings were made as to the parties1 standard of

living,

their

health,

financial

condition,

duration

of

the

marriage, the children, the relationship between property division
and the amount of alimony and child support awarded.

733 P.2d at

135.
The Court failed to make any Findings as to whether or not
DiAnn, given the fact that she had to change her employment shift
work from weekends and evenings to a day shift, thereby reducing
her hourly income by $5.00 per hour, had the ability to provide for
her own needs without considering the best interest of the children
and her "voluntary underemployment." Additionally, by imputing
income to her at a higher rate than she actually earned, the Court
further

abused

its

regarding alimony.

discretion

resulting

in

an unjust

order

As a result of DiAnn1s assuming Turner's share

of the child rearing responsibility and a larger percentage of the
child support obligation, the Court doubly punished DiAnn: no
alimony and less child support.
The Court heard testimony at trial that Mr. Turner had no
expenses for housing and that his monthly income was $4,661.00
15

(Transcript P. 42, L. 12-14).

The Court failed to make any

Findings as to whether or not Mr. Turner had the ability to pay
alimony to DiAnn. Based upon DiAnn1s actual income as testified to
at trial in the amount of $1,123.00 per month (Transcript P. 96),
the Court abused its discretion by failing to make Findings as to
DiAnn1s need for alimony, Turner's ability to pay or DiAnn1s
ability to meet her own needs.

Imputed income is not real income

nor does it help DiAnn meet her own needs.

DiAnn's monthly

expenses at trial were found to be $2,830 (R. 158). Her income was
$1,123 (Tr. P. 100, L. 22), and she was awarded $1,452.00 in child
support, leaving her with a shortfall of $255.00 per month.
The Court gave lip service to the length of the parties'
marriage (R. 158), but failed to consider it when making Findings
as to whether or not the length of the marriage (30 years) impacted
on the Court's decision not to award alimony to DiAnn as required
by § 30-3-5(7) . The Court also failed to consider the fault of Mr.
Turner in the break-up of the marriage as a factor in considering
alimony and failed to enter Findings as to whether or not Turner's
decision to move to St. George and not help DiAnn co-parent the
children, was a fault-based factor relative to an alimony award.
(U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (b) ; Noble v. Noble,

761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).)

When the Court imputed income to DiAnn, the imputed income is
not money that DiAnn earns and therefore could not be used towards
16

meeting her own needs for the purposes of alimony.

When the Court

entered a Finding that she was voluntarily underemployed, it needed
to make additional Findings whether or not that factor precluded
her from receiving alimony.

In fact, by ordering child support

based on imputed income, the Court created a requirement for a
specific finding that her voluntary underemployment to provide for
the children prevented her from being awarded alimony.
The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to the parties'
standard of living during the marriage.

Their combined 1995 gross

monthly income was $6,951.00 per month.

How DiAnn could maintain

a similar standard of living on an actual income of $1,123.00 per
month or why it was not a factor in declining to award alimony
requires a specific Finding by the Court which is lacking in the
Court's ruling.
D.

(Memorandum Decision, R. 158.)

The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding to Appellee
any Benefit or Increase in Equity Resulting from the Pay
down of the Mortgage by Appellant or the Appreciation in
Value of the Marital Home Prior to Payment by Appellant
of Appellee's Equity.

As was previously discussed above, the Court awarded no
alimony to DiAnn Turner.

However, the Court ordered that she pay

to Mr. Turner one-half of the equity in the marital home based upon
the total amount of equity at the time Mr. Turner's equity is paid
to him (Supplemental Memorandum Decision, R. 190) . The Court also
prevented

DiAnn

from obtaining
17

a new or second mortgage or

collateralizing the home in order to pay to him his equity so that
he would not receive the benefit of her pay down of the mortgage or
the appreciation of the home pending occurrence of one of the
triggering events described in the Supplemental Divorce Decree
(attaining of majority by the parties' youngest child, remarriage,
cohabitation, death of DiAnn, or sale of the home) .

(Supplemental

Decree, R. 197, 198.)
By preventing DiAnn from refinancing the home in order to pay
Turner's equity and by not providing her with the ability to
otherwise pay the equity by awarding alimony to her or reducing her
share of the child support obligation, the Court unjustly allowed
Mr. Turner to obtain the benefit of a pay down by DiAnn of the
mortgage and deprived her of the benefit of any appreciation in
value of the home pending payment of Mr. Turner's equity.
The parties' youngest child is 6 years of age (R. P. 2), and
should DiAnn choose not to sell the home until the youngest child
attains its majority, she may pay on the mortgage for at least the
next twelve years.

It is unfair and inequitable for Turner to

benefit from DiAnn's efforts in maintaining the mortgage for the
next twelve years when he receives the benefit of DiAnn's imputed
income and pays no alimony.

The Trial Court erred when it failed

to make Findings as to DiAnn's ability to refinance the home or
otherwise obtain Mr. Turner's share of the equity independent of
18

the ultimate

sale of the home to prevent him from unjustly

benefitting from her efforts. The Trial Court also failed to make
any findings as to why DiAnn was prohibited from mortgaging the
marital home (R. 197). Burke

v. Burke,

supra.

When the Court found that DiAnn, by having use of the home as
she raises the seven (7) children, receives a benefit to her that
must be shared with Turner who does not contribute to the childraising chore or payment of the mortgage without making Findings,
it further abused its discretion (Supplemental Memorandum Decision,
R. 190) .
In paragraph 2 of the Supplemental Memorandum Decision (R.
190) , the Court
Plaintiff

ruled

that

from benefitting

"If Defendant

wishes

to prevent

from Defendant's pay down of the

mortgage, Defendant can choose to buy-out Plaintiff's interest in
the home."

The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to how

she could buy it out or whether she even had the ability to do so.
Willey

v.

Willey,

866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993); {Burke

supra.
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v.

Burke)

E.

The USAA Debt.

The Court erred in failing to require Mr. Turner to pay the
USAA debt in its entirety.

Mr. Turner's Divorce Complaint alleged

that he should pay the debt and hold DiAnn harmless from it
7).

(R. P.

The Court failed to make any Findings as to either party's

ability to pay that debt, the source of the debt or any other
factor relative to the debt except that it was a "marital debt"
(Memorandum Decision, R. 159). Without awarding sufficient child
support or alimony to DiAnn, specific and detailed Findings should
have been made to justify what appears to be an unjust order
regarding the debt.
F.

Attorney's Fees-

The Court failed to make sufficient Findings regarding DiAnn's
need for attorney's fees or Mr. Turner's ability to pay her fees.
{Willey

v„ Willey,

Utah 1997.)

The Court failed to make adequate

Findings as to why DiAnn's requested attorney's fees of $4,73 6.00
(R. 118) were not awarded or why it awarded $1,650.00 (R. 191).
DiAnn requests additional attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Dahlberg

v. Dahlberg,

292 P.214 (Utah 1930); Peterson

189 P.2d 961 (Utah 1948) .
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v.

Peterson,

IX.
CONCLUSION.
The
regarding

Court

made

its

insufficient

determination

or

that

no

Findings

DiAnn

was

whatsoever
voluntarily

underemployed, that application of the Child Support Guidelines
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interests of the
children, or whether or not the unusual emotional or physical needs
of the children required DiAnn's presence in the home.

The Court

failed to support its child support award with a worksheet or make
Findings as to its child support award.

The Court, in refusing to

award alimony, made no Findings as to whether or not DiAnn had the
ability to meet her own needs or needed support from Mr. Turner,
whether or not Mr. Turner had the ability to support DiAnn, and
whether or not the length of the marriage, the parties' prior
standard

of living,

or the fault of Mr. Turner should be

considered by the Court

in making a determination

regarding

alimony.
Appellant requests this Court remand this matter to the Trial
Court for adequate and appropriate Findings relative to the issue
of voluntary underemployment, special or unusual needs of the
children, and their best interests. The failure of the Trial Court
to award DiAnn alimony was clearly an abuse of discretion creating
an unjust result.
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The Court failed to make adequate and appropriate orders
regarding disposition of the marital home and payment of Turner's
equity and DiAnn's ability or lack of ability to obtain a source to
pay to Mr. Turner his one-half of the equity.

No Findings were

made regarding the parties' ability to pay the USAA debt or the
reasons why the Trial Court awarded less than the amount of
attorney's fees requested by DiAnn.
DATED this /^/day of February, /JL998 .
Respectfcully submitted,

22

CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
on this the /Cf day of February, 1998, a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing uo:
Terry L. Christiansen
1920 Prospector Square
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Addendum A

Steven Kuhnhausen (1861)
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Mel von David Turner,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(Sole Custody and Paternity)

v.

Civil No. *DA

DiAnn Carol Turner,
Defendant/ Appellant.

FATHER

MOTHER

1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and
father for whom support is to be awarded.

COMBINED

7

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to
Instructions for definitions of income.

$ 2,490.00

$4,461.00

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.)

-0-

-0-

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1.)

-0-

-0-

2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in
Present Home Worksheet for either parent.
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted
Gross Income for child support purposes.

$ 2,490.00

$4,461.00

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined
Support Obligation. Enter it here.

$ 2,489.00

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

35%

6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's
1 share of the Base Support Obligation.

$9961)0

65%
$1,578.00

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor
Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table.
8.

Which parent is the obligor?

9.

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7 ? ( ) Yes
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
, and answer number 10.

10.

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( X ) other: extrapolated from six to seven children

) Electronic filing
': \wpdata\forms\child. sol

( ) Mother

( ) Manual filing

$6,951.00

( X ) Father
(X)No

$ 1,578.00

Addendum B

Steven Kuhnhausen (1861)
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Mel von David Turner,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(Sole Custody and Paternity)

v.

Civil No. *DA

DiAnn Carol Turner,
Defendant/Appellant.

FATHER

MOTHER

1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and
father for whom support is to be awarded.

COMBINED

7

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to
Instructions for definitions of income.

$ 1,123.00

$4,461.00

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.)

-0-

-0-

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1.)

-0-

-0-

2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in
Present Home Worksheet for either parent.
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted
Gross Income for child support purposes.

$ 1,123.00

$4,461.00

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined
Support Obligation. Enter it here.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

$2,156.00

20%

6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's
1 share of the Base Support Obligation.
_J>_ J31^0

80%
$1,725.00

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor
Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table.
8.

Which parent is the obligor?

9.

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7 ? ( ) Yes
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
, and answer number 10.

10.

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( X ) other: extrapolated from six to seven children

( ) Electronic filing
C :\wpdata\forms\child. sol

( ) Mother

( ) Manual filing

$ 5,584.00

( X ) Father
(X)No

$ 1,725.00
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78-45-7.14

JUDICIAL CODE

Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
From
6,701
6,801
6,901
7,001
7,101
7,201
7,301
7,401
7,501
7,601
7,701
7,801
7,901
8,001
8,101
8,201
8,301
8,401
8,501
8,601
8,701
8,801
8,901
9,001
9,101
9,201
9,301
9,401
9,501
9,601
9,701
9,801
9,901
10,001

Number of Children
3
4

lb
-

6,800
6,900
7,000
7,100
7,200
7,300
7,400
7,500
7,600
7,700
7,800
7,900
8,000
8,100
8,200
8,300
8,400
8,500
8,600
8,700
8,800
8,900
9,000
9,100
9,200
9,300
9,400
9,500
9,600
9,700
9,800
9,900
10,000
10,100

629
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728
732
737
741
746
750
755
759
763
768
772
777
781
786
790
795
799
803
808
812
817
821
826

1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,189
1,197
1,205
1,213
1,220
1,228
1,236
1,244
1,252
1,259
1,267
1,275
1,283
1,291
1,298
1,306
1,314
1,322
1,330
1,337
1,345
1,353
1,361
1,369
1,376
1,384
1,392
1,400

1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,520
1,531
1,541
1,551
1,562
1,572
1,582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623
1,633
1,644
1,654
1,664
1,675
1,685
1,695
1,705
1,716
1,726
1,736
1,747
1,757
1,767
1,777
1,788
1,798
1,808

1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,841
1,853
1,864
1,876
1,887
1,899
1,911
1,922
1,934
1,945
1,957
1,969
1,980
1,992
2,003
2,015
2,027
2,038
2,050
2,061

1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
2,000
2,013
2,026
2,039
2,052
2,064
2,077
2,090
2,103
2,116
2,129
2,141
2,154
2,167
2,180
2,193
2,206
2,218
2,231
2,244
2,257
2,270

2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,137
2,150
2,164
2,178
2,192
2,206
2,220
2,234
2,247
2,261
2,275
2,289
2,303
2,317
2,330
2,344
2,358
2,372
2,386
2,400
2,414
2,427
2,441

5

6

24
47

24
48

LOW INCOME TABLE
(Obligor Parent Only)
Monthly Adj
Gross Income
From
650 676 -

1

2

23
45

23
46

Number of Children
3
4

To
675
700

710

23
46

23
47

